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Mary Nee
Organizational growth can fundamentally undermine the social-change mission of a nonprofit organization if the adaptive responses to growth are not continually checked against mission and vision. As the executive director 
of a U.S. nonprofit created in response to the crisis of homelessness, I have observed 
that this danger is particularly acute when an organization evolves from advocacy to 
service delivery.
Over the past thirty years in the United States, organizations that were established 
to end homelessness grew and adapted to external conditions that led to a new kind 
of organization: the “homeless services agency,” which provided many worthwhile 
services, but ultimately did not end homelessness. On the contrary, the homeless 
population in Massachusetts (where I live and work) and across the nation has grown 
significantly with estimates upwards of 24,000 in Massachusetts and 3.5 million 
homeless in the United States today.1
 The experience of U.S. nonprofit homeless service organizations during this time, 
including hopeFound, the organization I lead, demonstrates how organizational 
growth diverted the sector from its original social-change vision of “ending 
homelessness,” which at its most fundamental level, means access to affordable 
housing and an income. 
For emerging social-change nonprofits in Israel, the U.S. nonprofit sector’s 
response to homelessness serves as a stark example of the unintended consequences 
when collective action is institutionalized and staff transformed from agents of social 
change to stakeholders of a system.
Instead of solving a societal crisis, the U.S. homeless services sector fostered the 
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growth of a new classification of citizens, “homeless people,” who required specialized 
services. Over time, the sector moved from the goal of delivering short-term 
emergency services, with an assumption of ending homelessness, to long-term service 
models in which the people served became clients in an ever-expanding system of 
emergency — but paradoxically permanent — shelters. 
Over the last decade, this sector has come to realize the implications of its 
adaptation to growth. This knowledge has forced a reassessment of how best to end 
homelessness, the conclusion of which is that the best approach is to place everyone in 
housing. This new perspective is driving another shift in public policies and in public 
and private funding; once again, homeless service organizations need to learn, adapt, 
and transform. 
Background, Advocacy, and Homelessness
In the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, faith-based and grassroots community 
organizations in Massachusetts and around the country began to advocate for public 
policies to address a growing and visible presence of homeless people living on the 
streets of major cities. This period witnessed a convergence of structural economic 
factors that caused a rapid increase in the number of homeless, literally driving people 
onto the streets. These factors included rapidly rising housing prices, dwindling 
employment opportunities for those with a high school education or less, the closing 
of mental health institutions, exclusionary zoning practices, and a reduction of federal 
funding for public housing and job training.
The response to the growing number of street homeless was to open emergency 
shelters managed by a combination of public and nonprofit agencies. Many of these 
shelters were operated by the original homeless activists, who, in order to receive 
public and private funding, incorporated as registered nonprofits, recruiting boards of 
directors and hiring administrative and program staff. 
From the early 1980s until the present day, this homelessness service system 
grew both in scale and scope. As organizations gleaned insights into the social and 
economic barriers that caused homelessness, they expanded their services to address 
these conditions to make an individual or family “ready for housing.” 
Federal policies and funding supported the growth of this sector, especially 
with the passage of the McKinney-Vento Act in 1987. Administered by the federal 
Department of Housing and Urban Development, the legislation funded emergency 
shelter, food, mobile health care, and transitional housing. Today, the federal 
government spends over $2 billion for homeless services2 with Massachusetts state 
government spending an additional $120 million.3 
This funding spawned many new services for the homeless and brought new kinds 
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of professionals to the sector, including medical providers, mental health counselors, 
case workers, and employment specialists. People staying in shelters became “clients” 
with individual, linear-sequenced service plans that charted their progress toward 
“readiness” for housing. 
In addition, homeless services agencies were initially focused on shelter and 
support services rather than on permanent housing. By the 1990s, however, many 
organizations expanded beyond the social service model and developed internal 
divisions to build and manage housing. This new organizational adaptation required 
another whole set of professional staff, including project managers, architects, and 
financial analysts. 
This expansion also generated new financial pressures; the demand for capital 
ushered fundraising professionals into the field to manage annual giving, capital 
campaigns, and major donor programs. To support these activities, organizations began 
to recruit a new kind of volunteer to sit on boards of directors; instead of the social 
activists, religious leaders, and agency clients who had traditionally populated these 
boards, organizations now required leaders with access to money and political influence. 
By the turn of the twenty-first century, the paradigm of homeless services again 
began to shift as organizations and funders adopted the Housing First approach, a 
philosophy of rapid rehousing.4 Housing First posits that vulnerable homeless are 
more responsive to interventions and social services after they are in their own 
housing, rather than while living in shelters or transitional facilities. In this model 
clients are given “keys” — immediate access to permanent independent apartments 
— in combination with intensive treatment and support services. Participation in 
treatment or sobriety is not a precondition for housing.
The Housing First model finds support in a growing body of research on 
homelessness that points both to the efficacy of rapid placement in housing and the 
money saved by reducing the need for shelters, emergency rooms, and intervention by 
the criminal justice system.5
A New Yorker article by Malcolm Gladwell, “Million-Dollar Murray,” vividly 
illustrated this approach, chronicling the experience of Murray Barr, a chronically 
homeless man in Reno, Nevada, who regularly received emergency services. Officials 
calculated that over a ten-year period, the services Murray received cost well over 
one million dollars. These costs would have been substantially less if he had received 
subsidized housing instead.6 
hopeFound
hopeFound began in 1983, when Michael Dukakis, then the Governor of Massachusetts, 
opened an emergency shelter in a local public hospital. Six months later, a group of 
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community leaders formed a nonprofit organization, hopeFound, to provide advocacy 
and fundraising support for the shelter. After a few years, the hospital ended its direct 
management of the shelter, contracting operations to hopeFound. 
I joined hopeFound just over five years ago and found an organization that had 
grown and adapted under the old paradigm of homelessness services. In assuming 
the management responsibilities for an emergency shelter from a public hospital, 
hopeFound had followed a fairly typical path for homeless services organizations with 
program expansion into addiction treatment, employment services, HIV counseling, 
and street outreach.
In the early 1990s, hopeFound purchased one twelve-unit lodging house as an 
affordable housing initiative, but this effort was not subsequently repeated due to 
capacity limitations and an internal perspective that it was primarily a “service 
organization,” helping adult men and women overcome homelessness through 
treatment and counseling.
On my first tour of hopeFound’s emergency shelter, managers proudly pointed 
to the sparkling facility and the great respect that shelter guests could expect 
from the staff. At the same time, I was dismayed to learn that a cohort of twenty-
six guests had been living in the shelter more than five years; one individual had 
lived there an astonishing nineteen years. Managers did not see this situation as 
problematic, however, because staff perceived these individuals as incapable of living 
independently. These guests were happy because other guests and staff in the shelter 
formed their community and support network.
I also learned that government support for the emergency shelters was based on 
occupancy levels, how many people were in beds. Lengths of stay in the shelter were 
neither time-limited nor comprehensively tracked. 
Today, five years later, I am proud to say that all of these twenty-six guests have 
been placed in housing; that every quarter we measure all of our programs against 
specific, time-bound outcomes, (including lengths of stay); and that we have a rapid 
rehousing initiative in the shelter so that within seventy-two hours of arriving at 
our door, all guests undergo an assessment and receive referrals to housing and 
employment counselors.
Additionally, without building a single unit of new housing, hopeFound has secured 
federal subsidies for rental housing and, through partnerships with a host of public 
and nonprofit housing developers, has achieved close to 510 placements to affordable 
housing during this time. Housing placements are no longer guided by individual 
readiness criteria; instead, housing is the first response, followed by at-home support 
services, if necessary.
To achieve this organizational transformation, the board and staff had the 
difficult task of honestly measuring programs and services against the agency’s 
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mission and vision. But first, new shared vision was required; hopeFound’s mission 
statement had evolved from a principled statement of ending homelessness to a list 
of services; what we did for clients rather than our vision of a society free from the 
scourge of homelessness.
So through a structured strategic planning process, the board and the 
management team reflected, debated, and ultimately developed a new statement of 
mission, vision, and values. 
This planning was greatly assisted by external currents. The urge to change 
became not just a philosophical debate, but a necessity driven by new realities: major 
funders, both public and private, were moving away from the old model of service. 
Future funding would be at risk if the organization did not adapt. 
The organization adopted a new vision statement that emphasized ending 
homelessness through providing permanent housing and a set of values that began: 
“shelters are an unacceptable form of permanent housing.”7 These decisions formed 
the foundation of hopeFound’s adaptation.
Underpinning this organizational change is an outcomes measurement system 
that aligns the organization’s mission with program services and client outcomes. 
These outcomes drive all services. We review data quarterly and report results 
widely, both within the organization and to external stakeholders. This year these 
outcome measures informed the performance plans and evaluations of every 
hopeFound employee. 
For some staff and board members, the transition was too difficult. For a period, 
we needed to accept the high-level turnover we experienced. For those that remained 
— and the new staff and board members who sought to be part of our new model 
— the change has been exciting and rewarding but also exhausting, constantly 
stretching our organizational capacity.
Once again, external forces are driving hopeFound’s future direction, in that both 
public and private funders are shifting dollars from emergency services to homelessness 
prevention, diversion from shelter, and permanent housing. As an organization that has 
adapted by confronting the realities of its external environment, measuring impact, 
and keeping our mission forefront in all we do, I believe we are prepared to evolve in a 
direction that will preserve the social change role for which we were established. 
My colleagues, leaders of nonprofit social change organizations in Israel, can 
learn significant lessons from the U.S. response to homelessness. Since the election 
of the Likud government in 1977, Israel has embarked on a policy of decentralization 
and privatization of social services to the nonprofit sector.8 This policy has led to the 
rapid growth of Israeli nonprofit organizations, which have increasingly assumed 
functions, including the provision of affordable housing, that the government 
previously managed.
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As a member of the Haifa–Boston Learning Exchange Network, I frequently found 
myself challenging my Israeli peers not to “adapt” to the increasing social service 
needs of their constituents for housing and food but to fight for the social safety-
net system that existed for more than forty years in their country, a system that 
guaranteed housing, employment, and health care to each citizen. 
Unfortunately, This principled response does not reflect the realities and direction 
of Israeli public policy. While a return to the broad-based publicly supported safety-
net is unlikely, Israeli NGOs can avoid the errors of their U.S. counterparts on issues 
of housing and homelessness by adapting in ways that allow them to remain true to 
their social-change missions. In the area of homelessness, I would suggest one way for 
my colleagues not to lose track of their mission: listen closely to what people who are 
homeless always respond when asked what they need — a permanent home.
•
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